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A Visit Inside Turkey's Islamist IHH
A trip to the headquarters of the extremist group that sponsored the
Mavi Marmara.
Claire Berlinski, WEEKLY STANDARD
June 21, 2010
http://berlinski.com/?q=node/146
Istanbul
The street outside the IHH, the Turkish organization that recently
dispatched the Mavi Marmara to its sanguinary fate in the eastern
Mediterranean, suggests a hopeful world of multi-ethnic and religious
harmony. Men and women in various forms of secular and religious
dress—beards, clean-shaven, headscarves, burqas—walk in and out of the
building in urgent conversation with Africans in dashikis, Swedes in
stained proletarian-wear, anti-Zionist rabbis sweating nervously in
black suits and payot. A gangly teenager strolls by in a T-shirt that
reads, “Virgins required: No experience necessary.” It isn’t clear
whether he’s off-message, highly ironic, or yet another Turkish kid
who bought a T-shirt he didn’t quite understand.
The flags of the world (not the Israeli one) are flapping gaily above
the street. The sign above the door reads, “The Fondation (sic) for
Human Rights and Freedom and Humanitarian Relief”—in English only.
Very few Turks read English, so this sign is not for their benefit.
Inside, everything is climate-controlled and glossy and modern, the
décor corporate. If ever you’re in Istanbul and down on your luck,
just head over to the IHH and announce you’re a Western journalist.
You’ll find the standards of hospitality excellent. You won’t see
anything that might make the folks back home uneasy—nothing hinting of
grim caves in Waziristan filled with raving bearded warlords screaming
unpleasantly about Jews and apes and infidels. The PR flacks express
some anxiety when we begin filming in the cafeteria; they worry that
if we shoot the Koranic verse near the steam tables, “people will know
we’re Islamists.” Does it matter, my colleague asks? They consider it
briefly, decide it doesn’t, and let us keep filming.
The IHH is part of the Free Gaza movement, an international
association dominated by Europeans and headquartered in Cyprus. Last
week, I spoke to IHH officials and European passengers on the Free
Gaza flotilla at length. My colleague and I videotaped the interviews
and put the complete footage on line. Anyone who wishes may consider
their comments in their full context.
Israel charges that the IHH has ties to al Qaeda, a claim endorsed by
such authorities as France’s top counter-terrorism magistrate,
Jean-Louis Bruguière. IHH spokesmen snort dismissively when asked
about this: “Israel never made such an accusation as that until they
killed ten [sic] of our own people,” says Ahmet Emin Da , the IHH’s
Middle East Special Representative and the coordinator of the Free
Gaza campaign. (Eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American
citizen were killed.) Its spokesmen note that the IHH holds special
consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social
Council; they point to the group’s 18-year history of humanitarian
work in, for example, Sudan, Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Chad, where they
have sent teams of physicians to treat cataract patients, restoring
sight to thousands. They are a charity, they say, not a terrorist
group.
After these conversations, I concluded that this debate misses the
point, which is that whether or not the group has ties to known
terrorists or known eye surgeons—I’ve seen no evidence of either
first-hand—it is an important new species of a non-governmental
political actor. Its rise to international prominence represents a
regional tactical development on the order of the PLO’s pioneering and
inventive use of terrorism. To call them terrorists is to muddy the
water; if you focus on looking for evidence of this you might fail to
recognize what’s truly worrying about them. Although clearly they are
Islamists, their chief weapon is not terror, but blackmail. They are
indeed a charity, but their charitable works serve as financial and
moral cover for a political goal, and that goal is repeatedly to force
Israel into a hideous checkmate wherein it must choose between
endangering itself and killing the IHH’s human shields.
It’s an old game, but this group isn’t Hamas: It’s more sophisticated,
there’s clearly a lot of money behind it, and it’s working with
Westerners who are not merely enthusiastic spectators to their
campaign, but full, active participants. In a sense it is an analogue
to Turkey’s AK party: It represents a sui generis version of political
Islam that many in the West find reassuring. After all, it doesn’t
look medieval and savage, and it seems to be operating, more or less,
in the context of Turkish democracy. But the IHH is determined to keep
taking on the Israeli military with ships full of human shields, at
the very real risk of provoking an Apocalyptic regional war that the
vast majority of Turkish citizens, from what I can tell, did not vote
for and do not want. No one in the West should be the least reassured.
Even Iran is not this reckless.
The IHH is now one of the more important players in the Middle East,
and certainly one of the most influential in Turkey. It is not an
elected body, nor an officially appointed foreign policy arm of any
elected government, but it has managed nonetheless to rupture the
Turkish-Israeli relationship, probably for at least a long while. The
crisis it deliberately precipitated has sent Turkey flying into a
gibbering, anti-Semitic rage. It has influenced the upcoming Turkish
elections in a way that will likely change the course of Turkish
history and that of the region. It has dictated foreign policy to the
United States and Europe. It looks as if it will succeed in forcing
Israel to lift the blockade of Gaza. What happens after that? Peace
will shine its light upon the Holy Land, I’m sure. But just in case
I’m wrong, the residents of southern Israel might consider moving out
of rocket range.
This group is not endeavoring to cow or alienate the West through
terrorist spectaculars. Their strategy is subtler and much smarter. It
is attempting instead to stage powerful publicity events that appeal
to the traditions of the Western conscience (while bypassing the
traditions of Western logic). Unlike al Qaeda or Hamas, it is highly
sophisticated in its public relations. Its European collaborators are
chiefly those on the Left still enamored with the idea of “direct
action,” if not so crazy about the idea of “elections.” It is
supported by a handful of Torah fundamentalist rabbis from the Neturai
Karta sect, apparently time-warped intact to Istanbul from an
18th-century Hungarian shtetl; they flew immediately to Istanbul
publicly to affirm the view that Zionism is an abomination and the
state of Israel illegitimate—a view the IHH’s spokesmen note with no
shy pride. If among their ranks are people who believe that Israel
should be destroyed, they say, this is hardly worthy of remark it is
a view held even by Jews. Those in the West inclined to shrug at the
predictable arrival of Neturai Karta on the grounds that everyone
knows they’re just nuts may not realize that everyone in Turkey knows
no such thing. The Turkish press is positively enamored with them.
Photos of them are everywhere. See? Even the Jews hate Israel. No
anti-Semitism to see here, just walk on by.
The IHH has appropriated the language of the Western civil rights
movements and deploys it fluently. Whether its members believe what
they’re saying when they use this language, or use it because they
know it sounds good to Western ears, is impossible to say. It is a bit
too cynical to dismiss the former possibility; after all, the language
of the civil rights movement is morally powerful and seductive. That’s
why the civil rights movement succeeded. It could very well be that
some of the members of the IHH sincerely see themselves as activists
in the tradition of Rosa Parks, and if certain aspects of their world
view do not add up to a consistent moral picture, who among us can
claim to be entirely consistent?
Its principal figures are highly educated Turks with an excellent feel
for appealing simultaneously to the media in the Arab world, Turkey,
and the West—in this sense, at least, Turkey is living up to its
reputation as a bridge between the Orient and the Occident—and a good
(but not excellent) grasp of the notion of “plausible deniability.”
They have close, friendly, personal relationships with members of the
AKP government, they say, and, as they put it, get their money from
the same place and derive their support from the same political base.
The AKP, by the way, is in fact orchestrating the recent “spontaneous”
public protests here against Israel. They have sent text message after
text message to their constituents inviting them to join.
Da holds a degree in journalism and a doctorate in international
relations from Marmara University. While he preferred to answer my
questions in Turkish, his English was excellent. He is obviously
conversant with the principles of media relations: Never get angry,
don’t be defensive, stick to the talking points, feed the journalists
a decent meal. The IHH website is extremely slick and professional,
translated into flawless English, French, German, Russian, and Arabic.
Only a handful of Turkish corporations have anything like this kind of
sophisticated media outreach. This is also characteristic of the AKP,
whose media outreach and campaign tactics are vastly more
sophisticated—and Westernized—than those of rival parties in Turkey.
Indeed, an American political pollster who lives here and works
throughout the Middle East and former Soviet Union once remarked to me
that she found it hard to believe the AKP was not being advised by
top-flight U.S. election consultants. It was the small, professional
details, she said, like the way the AKP, and only the AKP, brought
plenty of garbage cans to their rallies. (She then dismissed this
hypothesis, though, on the grounds that there is no such thing as an
American political consultant who can resist bragging about his
success.)
The IHH, I too would guess, has been advised by Western media
strategists—this look and feel does not happen spontaneously in
Turkey—but if pressed they will admit they haven’t much use for the
Western political perspective. When I remark to Da that the IHH is
believed to be a front organization for the Islamist financing of
terrorist groups, he does not precisely say what you might expect your
standard Western humanitarian aid organization to say (nor does he
deny the claim). “If you’re looking through the glasses of the West,”
he says blithely, “and you think those people who struggle for
independence against Serbia, in Afghanistan during the Russian
invasion, in Iraq against the American invasion, Palestinians against
Israel, then you can look at it that way, but we don’t consider them
terrorist groups.”
They do not consider Hamas a terrorist group, either—it’s a political
party, they say—and to speak to them is sense that the events that led
to the imposition of the blockade, to wit, the launching from Gaza
into sovereign Israeli territory of nearly 10,000 rockets, are in
their view trivial. While they don’t approve of suicide bombings, adds
Da , “given the situation the Palestinians are in, we see it as a
normal, natural result of the situation imposed on them by Israel.”
Zionism, affirms Da , is racism. “The United Nations has accepted
this,” he adds, “so we don’t have the luxury of rejecting this.” The
state of Israel, he allows, “can exist,” given that this seems to be
the consensus in Ramallah. “I go along with that. Whatever the
Palestinian people want and have decided, I go along with that.” But
when I mention the Hamas Charter, which calls for the destruction of
Israel—and note that Hamas, too, claims to speak for the Palestinian
people—his reply is only that “different groups can think differently,
Islamic Jihad can think differently.” This group of free thinkers, as
I assume he well knows, is completely in control of Gaza. I can't see
how any reasonable person could spend a day at this place and conclude
that Israel had no good reason to insist upon inspecting the cargo of
a ship laden by the IHH and bound for Gaza. It would have been
madness—or at least insanely negligent—to have permitted it to arrive
without scrutiny.
The IHH does not explicitly say that it is their policy to hide behind
human shields, but they don’t much try to conceal it, either. Da ’s
explanation of this at least has some comic value. “Everybody from
American clergy to European politicians were trying to break that
blockade,” he said. “The people that are risking their lives to bring
aid to these people, would they be doing it to aid Hamas?”
I interrupted him. “That means you knew they were risking their lives?”
“They knew they were going into a risky area”
“So why were you sending women and children into that situation?” I ask.
“They were volunteers, we’re not pulling anybody—”
“How can a one-year-old child be a volunteer?”
“We announced the campaign around the world, and thousands of people
applied, and they did go through a selection process.”
“And how did you decide a one-year-old child would be an appropriate
candidate to send through an Israeli military blockade?”
“That kid was the boat captain’s son, the second captain’s son, from the crew.”
“And that was the reason you put him into this situation?”
“He brought all his family with him. Normally it’s illegal to bring
along your family, if you’re the captain, but what he did was put them
on the passenger list, and that way they got on the boat, because they
was on the passenger list.”
“And no one said, ‘This is a dangerous operation, we’re about to run a
blockade, an Israeli-Egyptian blockade, about to do something that’s a
military provocation, perhaps we shouldn’t bring the kids along?’”
“We announced we were going to break this blockade, this blockade
that’s against international law, and we set some health and legal
criteria, and those people that fit the criteria got on the boat.”
“If you wanted to break a military blockade, why didn’t you leave the
job to the military of the elected government of Turkey, instead of
doing it yourself with civilian human shields?”
“It’s not a matter between Israel and Turkey, this was a human mission
to break the blockade.”
No one we speak to denies that the Mavi Marmara passengers attacked
the commandoes with everything they had on hand. They only offer the
justification that this was perfectly normal: “Imagine that you were
sitting at home, in your living rooms, and people that you don’t know
come into your house with guns and weapons,” Da explains. (Israelis
who were literally attacked in their homes by Hamas rockets were, in
the view of one passenger, just whining about a bunch of "flying
garbage cans" that would only kill you if they hit you directly in the
head.)
“They tried to board on the side,” explains Greek citizen Dmitri
Plionis, who was on the Mavi Marmara, “but they couldn’t, because
people were throwing things to them, you know, chairs, and things like
that.” He mentions the passengers’ use of sticks, slingshots, and
water cannons. They had no guns, he insists, which he seemed to think
an essential point. I’m not sure why. Dual-use objects deployed with
malice can be perfectly lethal enough, as the 9/11 hijackers
illustrated.
Notable are the European passengers’ indifference to two things: the
foreign policies of their elected governments and any political issue
in the world, save Gaza. “We took upon ourselves the responsibility
our governments didn’t take,” says the former Israeli and now Swedish
citizen Dror Feiler. “We have succeeded in making Sarkozy, and
Berlusconi, and Ashdown, England, everyone, even Obama yesterday
evening, to say the siege in Gaza cannot continue. The people have
spoken. The people don’t have to wait for the next election.”
When I ask whether they have considered the consequences of their
actions for the region as a whole, they shrug. “We know politics
everywhere,” said Plionis. We read newspapers everywhere. We’re not
morons. But we don’t care. It’s not our field.”
“So you are singly preoccupied with Gaza?” I ask.
“Yes.”
Comments like this may be taken as evidence that the activists are not
anti-Israel, but anti-Semitic, given that they single out the Jewish
state for unique and disproportionate criticism. The evidence is
unnecessary. It should be enough that they single out Israel for
unique and disproportionate criticism, whether or not they are
motivated by something recognizably or traditionally anti-Semitic. It
is no great thing to be motivated by fashion, illogic, or zealotry,
either, especially if it leads you to the conclusion that running a
military blockade with a ship full of civilians in the world’s most
volatile conflict zone would be an excellent idea.
You do not need to exaggerate the malice of this group to recognize
that it is bent on lighting matches in a tinderbox. Nor do you need to
judge them as terrorists and anti-Semites to be alarmed. What they
are—in their own words—should be more than enough for the West to get
worried.
=============================================
Women For Israel's Tomorrow (Women in Green)
POB 7352, Jerusalem 91072, Israel
Tel: 972-2-624-9887 Fax: 972-2-624-5380
mailto:wfit2@womeningreen.org
VOLUNTEER WITH THE ISM! COME TO THE HOLY LAND AND GET RAPED BUT REST
ASSURED THE ISM WILL COVER IT UP SO NOBODY KNOWS ABOUT IT!
PA, protest leaders hushed up attempted rape of U.S. activist
By Avi Issacharoff Haaretz Published 03:14 15.07.10
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/pa-protest-leaders-hushed-up-attempted-rape-of-u-s-activist-1.302015
The Palestinian protests against Israel in several West Bank villages have
garnered worldwide praise. However, as with other massive movements, the
Palestinian popular protest has its darker side.
The Palestinian Authority, as well as the leaders of the popular protests in
villages such as Bil'in, Na'alin, Umm Salamuna, have been trying to keep the
following story from both public knowledge and the media's eye: One of the
more prominent activists in Umm Salamuna - a village south of Bethlehem,
long entrenched in a battle against the West Bank separation fence - is
suspected of the attempted rape of an American peace activist who had been
residing in the village as a show of her support for the protest.
Omar Aladdin, who was arrested three months ago on suspicions of attempted
rape, was subsequently released after agreeing to apologize to the young
woman. However, Haaretz learned that representatives of both the popular
protest movement and the PA have since pressured the American peace activist
to prevent her from going public with the story.
The incident allegedly took place last April when Aladdin, who had served a
term in an Israeli jail in the past, arrived one evening at the guest house
where many
foreign peace activists were staying. The European and American female
activists there reportedly agreed to let Aladdin stay with them after he
told them he feared the Israel Defense Forces were on his tail, adding that
he'd been severely beaten at an IDF checkpoint only a week before.
During his stay, Aladdin allegedly attempted to rape a Muslim-American
woman. The woman managed to escape; one villager who encountered her after
the
incident said she appeared to be in a state of shock.
When news of the incident reached the village's popular committee, the
protests' governing body, Aladdin reportedly refused to apologize - saying
the encounter had been marginal and normal. The American activist then asked
the committee to notify the authorities of the attempted rape, resulting in
the man's arrest in Bethlehem. After Aladdin agreed to apologize for the
incident, the PA police released him from custody.
The woman was subsequently convinced to retract her complaint to avoid
tainting the image of the popular protest.
However, the Umm Salamuna case does not appear to be the only one. Activists
know of other incidents in which Palestinians have allegedly sexually
assaulted foreign peace activists, a subject apparently raised in
discussions held among various popular committees.
Foreign female activists regularly participate in protests in the villages
of Bil'in, Na'alin and others, where the activists stay in separate houses.
Some villagers do not agree with these housing arrangements, claiming the
villages' youth, who frequently visit the activists, are corrupted by the
young women.
Mahmoud Zwahara, the popular committee's coordinator for the Umm Salamuna
and Ma'sara region, said in response: "The struggle against the separation
fence is a joint battle, which does not target Israeli identity or Jews. We
hope that our activity will show the Israeli soldiers that they must cease
their actions against us, as well as committing human rights violations."
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
BREAKING!!!! NEW EVIDENCE SEIZED ON
FREE GAZA SHIPS PROVE ISM INVOLVED
IN AIDING TERRORIST GROUP HAMAS AND
PROVIDES AMPLE EVIDENCE OF
VIOLATIONS OF US TAX AND ANTI-
TERRORISM LAWS! SEE BELOW
Inside documents of the Free Gaza movement seized
in the recent flotilla expose considerable
discrepancies between its strategy and tactics and its
public stance. The documents prove, among other
things, the attempts to conceal the aid to the Hamas
administration since Hamas is designated as a
terrorist organization in the US.
Training document by Huwaida Arraf below:
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Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
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June 27, 2010 |
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Inside documents of the Free Gaza movement seized in the recent flotilla expose considerable discrepancies between its strategy and tactics and its public stance. The documents prove, among other things, the attempts to conceal the aid to the Hamas administration since Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization in the US. |
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The logo of the Free Gaza movement
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1. Established in 2006,
the Free Gaza movement (hereinafter: Free Gaza) is a pro-Palestinian/pro-Hamas group whose stated purpose is to “break the siege” imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover.
Free Gaza is registered in Cyprus as a human rights project and is headquartered in Nicosia. Its website says that Free Gaza has branches in 28 countries, including 11 in Europe, 5 in North America (4 in the US and one in Canada), and a branch in Israel (referred to on the movement's website as “Palestine 1948 territories”). The organizational framework of Free Gaza
also includes the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), which also took part in the latest flotilla.
2.
Free Gaza played an important role in the coalition of organizations which orchestrated the latest flotilla, even though the dominant force was the Turkish IHH. Free Gaza started sending aid flotillas to the Gaza Strip in 2008. Prior to the latest flotilla, Free Gaza was able to send four other aid flotillas to the Gaza Strip:
a.
August 2008: two ships departed from Cyprus and arrived at the port of Gaza on August 23 (BBC, August 23, 2008).
b.
October 2008: a yacht named Dignity with 26 activists and medical supplies on board arrived in Gaza on October 29 (JTA, October 29, 2008).
c.
December 2008: the same yacht, Dignity, with about 3 tons of medical supplies, attempted to penetrate the waters of Gaza but was stopped by the Israeli navy (ynet, December 30, 2008).
d.
June 2009: a ship called Spirit of Humanity, which attempted to reach Gaza on June 30, was stopped by the Israeli navy near the Gaza port (Jerusalem Post, June 29, 2009).
3. The
movement's mission, as appears on its website, is to
break the siege of Gaza. It also states that it will not ask for Israel’s permission for its actions, since the movement's intent is “to overcome this brutal siege through
civil resistance and
non-violent direct action, and establish a permanent sea lane between Gaza and the rest of the world” (Free Gaza website).
4.
Free Gaza is now organizing yet another flotilla to the Gaza Strip. Nidal Hejazi, a Free Gaza senior official in Norway, said that
the movement is now planning to acquire yet another boat from Norway to depart for the Gaza Strip as soon as possible. He said he was hoping to organize a flotilla consisting of more than ten additional boats from European countries. According to Hejazi, upon returning from Turkey on June 3, the movement started working on a list of passengers from Norway to join the flotilla, and the list will be finalized in the coming days (Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV, June 5, 2010).
5. Inside documents of Free Gaza seized in the latest flotilla (see appendices for the unedited, complete text)
deal with the movement's strategy and with briefings given to its activists prior to the flotilla’s departure. Analysis and comparison of the inside documents to the movement's public stance
shows significant discrepancies and even contradictions between them. For example:
a.
Legal aspect: a legal briefing ("legal information") given by Free Gaza to its activists shows that the movement is well aware of the legal problem of delivering assistance to the Hamas de-facto administration in the Gaza Strip, particularly considering that the US designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. Reading between the lines also shows that while Free Gaza publicly states that the aid is for the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip,
Free Gaza is aware that, in fact, it assists the Hamas de-facto administration. Therefore, at a legal briefing for activists who took part in the flotilla,
they were warned against making any statement or taking any action that could be construed as providing material assistance to Hamas to avoid being incriminated in the US and in other countries (the movement has activists in the US whose participation in the flotilla seems to contradict US law; also, Free Gaza raises funds in the US, where it has a contact man for allegedly humanitarian purposes, yet those purposes are in fact clearly political).
b.
Political aspect: during the legal briefing, as a way of solving the problem of Hamas’ designation as a terrorist organization, the activists were told that
Free Gaza had publicly announced that it had no political agenda, and that it was committed to “non-violent humanitarian assistance” to the Palestinian people (Free Gaza is registered as a
Human Rights Project, a definition which appears on its website). However, according to an
inside document found on the Mavi Marmara, the goals of the flotilla were
clearly political rather than humanitarian (the minimum goals defined in the document are
generating media [impact] about the blockade on the Gaza Strip and pushing foreign governments to take punitive action against Israel; delivering humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip was not listed as a goal).
c.
Response to possible scenarios during the voyage: Free Gaza drew up “defensive” scenarios for the flotilla
based on the premise that the IDF would be unable to stop the boats without using force. Several tactics are listed to prevent the IDF from taking over the boat. One of the things mentioned is
putting obstructions with sharp points on the deck and barricading in the wheelhouse and the engine room.
d. Although those tactics pale in comparison to the organized violence used by IHH, they are still incompatible with instructions given by Free Gaza to its activists, which categorically prohibited the use of verbal of physical violence. It therefore appears that the term “non-violent resistance”, which appears in the instructions of human rights organizations which took part in the flotilla,
was open to interpretation by the various organizations and the various activists, who were eager to confront the IDF soldiers (as demonstrated by the preparations made by IHH, which also defines itself as a humanitarian organization, for a violent confrontation with the IDF).
6. What follows is an analysis of Free Gaza inside documents seized in the latest flotilla.
Appendix
A
Legal briefing given by Free Gaza to passengers on the ship Challenger (it can be assumed that a similar briefing was given to Free Gaza activists on other ships)
1. A document titled
“Legal Information” was seized aboard the Challenger, a Free Gaza ship. The document notes that Hamas is
designated as a "global terrorist" organization by the US Treasury Department. In addition, it states that the UN has also blacklisted Hamas as a terrorist organization. Consequently, a US citizen providing “material support” to Hamas may face criminal charges in US courts. This may also pose a problem to citizens of other countries, which is why Free Gaza advises them to check the laws and regulations on dealing with Hamas in their countries.
2.
Reading between the lines, it appears that Free Gaza is well aware that transporting aid to the Hamas de-facto administration, considered to be an inseparable part of Hamas by the US administration, is a violation of US law.
3.
The document illustrates that Free Gaza is aware that it is legally problematic to deliver aid to the Hamas de-facto administration in the Gaza Strip, particularly in the US, where Hamas is banned.
1 Therefore, the document contains a legal briefing of sorts ("legal information") to activists taking part in the flotilla, the main points of which are:
a.
The activists from the various countries, particularly US residents, must avoid even the appearance of providing "material support" to Hamas, including its leadership.
b. Free Gaza has said publicly and repeatedly that
it serves no political agenda whatsoever and that it is engaged solely in non-violent
humanitarian support for the Palestinian people, not the Palestinian leadership. Under no circumstances should any participant make a public statement of affinity or admiration of any political group in Palestine (
note: the public portrayal of providing humanitarian support for the Palestinian people as the movement's goal is
incorrect, since an inside document found aboard the Mavi Marmara
defined the goals of the flotilla to be political, not humanitarian—see Appendix B for details).
The original document:
Appendix B
Inside document detailing the strategy and tactics of
Free Gaza in preparation for the flotilla
Overview
1. Found on one of the computers seized aboard the Mavi Marmara was the draft of an inside document ("not for distribution") dated March 7, 2010. The document describes the goals of and preparations for the flotilla, lists problems and offers solutions.
2. Following are the main issues that appear in the document:
a.
The goals of the flotilla: the goals of the flotilla as defined in the document are clearly
political, contradicting the public image of “humanitarian support” which appears in the legal briefing. The “minimum goal” is to “
generate a lot of media about the blockade on Gaza” and the “situation of Palestinians in Gaza”. A secondary goal is “
taking legal/political action, including jail stays,
to push foreign governments to do more than make statements, but to
take punitive action towards Israel.” Elsewhere in the document, the goal is said to be generating media coverage and putting pressure on Israel.
b.
Importance of flotilla’s success in view of Free Gaza’s financial difficulties: the document states that the movement is “in a bad financial position” for the current flotilla and for other flotillas to follow: “There is virtually no likelihood of us [i.e., the movement] being able to get more funds for a mission that does not result in tangible results for Gaza.”
c.
"The Galloway Factor": George Galloway is a former British pro-Hamas parliament member who played a key role in organizing Lifeline-3, the previous aid convoy to the Gaza Strip. The participants of the previous convoy confronted Egyptian authorities, subsequent to which George Galloway was declared a persona non grata in Egypt. According to the Free Gaza document, George Galloway no longer assists Free Gaza as much as he did in the past (for his own reasons). The document notes that Galloway may not be able to get much support for a flotilla if the ships do not reach Gaza’s shores.
In the view of Free Gaza, this factor makes it all the more important for the flotilla to reach Gaza.
d.
Flotilla passengers: the passengers on behalf of Free Gaza were divided into three categories: celebrities and VIPs, parliament members (from national parliaments and ideally not backbenchers), and union leaders. Free Gaza considered increasing the number of passengers since it had permission to bring its passengers on the IHH passenger ship (i.e., the Mavi Marmara). That combination of passengers was designed to increase the media impact of the flotilla.
e.
Potential scenarios for the voyage: the document analyzes several “defensive” scenarios, based on a premise that is the fundamental guideline of the flotilla: “We will not turn back. The only way for Israel to stop us is to use force” (from a sub-chapter titled “Mission Strategy”). The scenarios raised in the document can be summarized as follows:
1.
Aerial boarding (of soldiers): the document examines how boarding can be prevented. One of the methods mentioned is
putting obstructions with sharp points on the deck, making it too dangerous for the soldiers to board (
note: the behavior agreement distributed by Free Gaza to its activists prior to the launch of the flotilla says that the activists shall not use verbal or physical violence and that the mission was designed to support the “non-violent resistance of the Palestinians”. The inside document makes it clear that the term “non-violent resistance” is open to interpretation that may change the non-violent and “defensive” resistance into a violent and offensive one, which was what happened aboard the Mavi Marmara).
2.
If IDF soldiers do manage to board the ship, the Free Gaza activists were to focus on two areas: the wheelhouse and the engine room. The document says that the wheelhouse had to be made “impenetrable”, which would require replacing glass with bullet-proof glass, replacing doors with steel doors, and adding locks.
3.
Using a tugboat to prevent the ship from coming to Gaza. In that case, the ship would try to outmaneuver the tugboat and reach the Gaza Strip, even though its chances of success were unclear.
4.
Opening fire (by IDF) or using explosives to neutralize the ship. Free Gaza’s “defensive option” for that scenario was
putting VIPs on the cargo ship's deck (hoping their presence would deter the IDF soldiers).
5.
Blocking the cargo ships while giving the passenger ship permission to proceed. In that case, the question was whether the mission was worth continuing with only the passenger ship. The decision was to be made only after the launch of the flotilla.
f.
Behavior on the passenger ship: the author of the document believes that there would be a way to deter the kind of boarding Free Gaza had with the Spirit of Humanity (a ship sent by the movement on June 30, 2009, which was stopped by the Israeli navy near the Gaza port).
This required putting 1.5-meter steel poles over the sides of the ship. A more likely option was that the Israelis would try to ram the ship, as they had done before.
g.
Support from various bodies and organizations: letters from unions and letters from parliaments and governments calling on Israel not to interfere must be prepared; ambassadors in Tel-Aviv must be called on to request no interference from Israel (the countries mentioned are Venezuela, Chile, India, South Africa, Ireland, Belgium, Britain, and Norway); UNIFIL and NATO must be asked for inspection and escort; live broadcasts from the ship must be arranged (the document details a media plan to be implemented in the various stages of the flotilla’s journey).
The original document
DRAFT
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NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
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UPDATED 3/07/2010
Free Gaza Strategy
There are now two parts to the strategy – one for the overall FG situation and one for the mission. The two are not inseparable, as it is prudent to think not only of how we conduct this mission, but also what happens the day after.
CURRENT STATUS
Boats
2 new passenger ships for high profilers
1 FG boat for activists
1 Cargo ship from IHH
1 passenger ship from IHH (500 pax)
1 passenger ship from ECESG
pending –
cargo ship (FG)
cargo ship (Greece)
passenger ship (Turkey)
passenger ship (Greece)
cargo ship (Sweden)
ship (Indonesia)
Finances
The FG accounts (including what is being held aside and what is held elsewhere,
seems to have approximately 50,000 . From that, at least X will be needed up front for the FG cargo ship and other costs related to holding onto the passenger ships that FG possesses.
There is currently no money available for the mission itself for FG, though efforts are being made to secure those funds.
Ports
It is clear that Cyprus will not be a point of departure. Turkish ships can leave from Turkey. FG and Greek ships (if any) can leave from Greece, though the situation in Greece will have to be monitored in the event that the economy dives again and more strikes and unrest follow. The FG cargo ship can leave from its position now (if we get the ship).
Timing
The earliest we will know about cargo ship is March 20, and maybe not until March 31. We still do not know what, if any, kind of repairs will be needed and how long it will take. For this ship to be in position to join rest of flotilla, at least 2 weeks are needed. Therefore, if we are using this cargo ship, it is unlikely we can be ready to go with passengers from port before April 25.
Given the above factors, it seems that at as FG, we should next consider the overall FG situation, in order to make decisions that will affect the mission itself.
OVERALL FG SITUATION
As stated above, we are in a bad financial position for the mission and for afterwards, if we go ahead with the purchase of the cargo ship. We are also in a limited position in terms of trying to raise more funds if this mission is not successful, in that there is virtually no likelihood of us being able to get more funds for a mission that does not result in tangible results for Gaza. Getting media, creating pressure on Israel, etc. are all good, but unlikely to yield greater funding opportunities. This is particularly true if we end up not in possession of one or more of our ships, or with ships damaged, regardless of what legal strategy we pursue.
Additionally, we cannot ignore the Galloway factor, which practically means that while he may not find as much support as he has in the past, for various reasons mostly of his own doing, and while he may not be able to get as much support for a flotilla if ours does not reach Gaza’s shores, the fact is that he has far greater outreach ability by virtue of his name and the willingness of key people to support him because of his political position as an MP and what he has said/done vis-à-vis Arab governments. Thus, whatever effort we make in the wake of our mission,
unless we arrive in Gaza, will undoubtedly be in competition with Galloway, and so far, we have not been able to meet that challenge in terms of funds raised, having a network operating to get funds at that level and to do so in a timely manner.
Now, moving on to other considerations that factor in the financial picture.
Given the responses to the email that was sent out asking for each of us to identify our minimum goal for this mission and the minimum ship requirement for launching this mission, the responses lined up pretty much in accordance with this position:
MINIMUM GOAL:
The goal of this mission is to generate a lot of media about the blockade on Gaza and the illegal/criminal nature of it, as well as the situation of Palestinians in Gaza. Secondly, but connected is the goal of taking legal/political action, including jail stays, pushing foreign governments to do more than make statements, but to take punitive action towards Israel.
Our position, then, is that reaching Gaza, while our intention is not our minimum strategic goal.
CARGO SHIP:
This point is seemingly this point is moot now. The IHH has a cargo ship, so we have a minimum of 1, which was the majority opinion of those who responded.
The question now is, does it make sense for FG to get a cargo ship
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see below for explanation and for where we need to make a strategic decision.
HOLD 2 BOATS FOR IMMEDIATE FOLLOW UP:
There is basically a split among those who responded to this, so no decision here.
See below for further explanation why this might make sense, though given the minimum goal for the mission.
For strategic consideration for next mission and FG overall
Given the consensus mission goal, there needs to be decisions derived based on that position, regarding the other points listed above.
Since we have confirmation that we have 1 cargo ship, the pressing question becomes does FG need to get this other cargo ship that is in auction, now that there is competition and that it is potentially going to set us back in terms of timing for mission? I list here some Pros/Cons, but I think we need a decision on this ASAP. (I have tried not to factor in hypothetical situations, as this becomes a never-ending exercise, and should not be how we base this decision – for every ‘if’ on one side, we can add an ‘if’ on the other).
PROS/CONS of having a FG Cargo Ship
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Pros |
Cons |
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1. Allows more cargo to be brought |
1. Cost involved is quite high (management) and a drain on resources that we are not secured of |
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2. Allows for more groups to participate in providing cargo for mission |
2. Owning the ship post-mission will be costly and require full-time attention |
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3. One more ship that is part of flotilla |
3. Given the minimum goal for the mission, there does not seem to be a strategic reason to have more than 1 cargo ship |
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4. Having 2 cargo ships will necessitate a bigger effort by Israel to stop the flotilla |
4. Will require additional expense to secure more cargo, which will require more fundraising |
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5. While we can bring some material, this is still largely a symbolic measure that until proven that we can deliver, will not be seen as a viable undertaking – having the one cargo ship from IHH allows for the symbolic value already and for testing the viability of this tactic |
OPTION 1
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GET FG CARGO SHIP
If we decide on getting this cargo ship, then we proceed accordingly and must stay in this position of being unable to take more concrete action with regard to date, cargo, etc. until we know for sure that this is our ship. Given that the idea of pursuing a back-up cargo ship was pretty much shot down, then we might yet end up in a position of not having a FG cargo ship.
OPTION 2
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NO FG CARGO SHIP
If we decide to not get this ship, then we have to first make sure it is OK with Malaysia, explaining why it is not strategic, and why we are still achieving what we/they want by having the IHH cargo ship. We can use those funds in part then, to procure cargo, which would allow Malaysia to still ‘take credit’ (if that is a concern) for providing building materials to Gaza. If we decide on not getting this ship, then we should be able to move more quickly towards setting time, procuring and getting cargo in place (from departure point of IHH ship), etc. Not getting the ship also frees up funds for FG work in the mission – not just the cost of the cargo ship, but also the cost of the management company and the cost of cargo.
When considering which option, I think we really need to consider financial/logistic aspects of this, notably:
- if we are planning to take legal action, political work and do media work for an extended period after a mission that is stopped, then we need to have funds to do so;
- for those of you who think that regardless of what happens on this mission that FG will continue to send missions to Gaza in some way, then FG must have financial resources to be able to do so;
- having a cargo ship in possession will require ongoing costs and management of the ship, and someone from FG will have to be involved in this.
In terms of the prospect of holding 2 passenger boats back and have them ready for an immediate launch in the event that Israel stops the flotilla, the question to consider is does this fit into the minimum strategic goal for the mission. If the flotilla is not stopped, then these boats will be ready to head to Gaza with a follow up flotilla when the initial flotilla returns from Gaza. Again, some Pros/Cons are (these are only applicable for consideration in planning for if the flotilla is stopped):
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